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Fire Wars Home and Abroad
By FUSEE staff July 2004 Flaming battle fields across the landscape. Occupied areas not controlled as promised. Insurgent conflagrations raging at will. A massive battle campaign initiated on intelligence known to be false or incomplete. Congressional approval for this regime change gained largely through partisan bullying and intimidation. A vast uncooperative territory invaded and placed under a military-styled command. Crony companies winning lucrative contracts with little attention to their expensive bids. Contractors filling jobs traditionally done by public servants. Low-level participants acting on implied but not actual orders so that they become culpable and higher ups protected because such orders would violate standard procedures. Dissenting voices within the ranks gagged and purged. Dissenting voices outside viciously attacked and their patriotism questioned. Locals remain skeptical, critical, unsupportive and even hostile to the policies and goals of the occupying administration. Sound like Iraq? Yes, but these problems could also be applied to federal policies for managing wildland fires in the western U.S.
Five elements and their consequences make our wildland management policies hauntingly similar to Iraq, and may just as equally attract heightened public scrutiny and criticism. First, the "Let's roll" attitude of the land management agencies has alienated many. The agencies seem to have little humility and much imperious demeanor and hostility against those who question their authority. The Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) pushed by the Bush Administration gives the agencies more power to conduct business with even less public involvement, oversight, or accountability. Long-term, sustainable ecological restoration cannot be gained at the expense of democratic participation. Second, the partisanship and phony coalition building during the Congressional consideration of the HFRA antagonized many who could have become excellent allies in a extensive coalition to deal with the wildfire crisis. Alternative viewpoints were ridiculed and suppressed rather than objectively considered, and loyal opponents were bulldozed over. This leaves many fire professionals and public stakeholders without stakes in the process and indifference to the outcome. Third, there is a disjunct between on-the-ground conditions and their flawed descriptions in the HFRA proposal. While the proposal almost exclusively focused on fuel loads, many scientists believe that climate and weather effects on fuel moisture may be the main factor driving large wildfires. When intensively managed forests and plantations burn as readily as unmanaged forests, it is right to question the rationale for extending the plantation model of agroforestry as a means of fuels management. Likewise, the coarse-scale maps used to prepare condition class assessments have been inappropriately used by politicians to alarm the public about possible "wildfires of mass destruction," but the data has yet to be properly ground-truthed. It is apparent that HFRA proponents have misused the data to push their predetermined policy.
Fourth, there continues to be extravagant money flows to reactive rather than proactive actions --with no end in sight. The few "proactive" programs (such as logging large trees) feed favored cronies, but do not address the root fuels problems, and make fire conditions worse. Meanwhile, just like the war in Iraq, the government continues to lowball the budgets for fire suppression, requiring supplemental funding requests. The taxpaying public will become restive and sour on all of those involved in wildland fire management, including ground-level firefighters, when wildfire disasters do not decrease after billions and billions are spent on logging and firefighting.
Fifth, a crisis is being used to advance political agendas and subsidize crony companies with subsidized and discounted public natural resources or to secure lucrative contracts. The public could become furious when they wake up and realize that those in power used a crisis to further their own aims rather than honestly address the issues.
Ground-level wildland firefighters must begin speaking out against these five obstacles to safe, ethical, and ecological fire management. Otherwise, the public may begin to believe that firefighters are part of the problem, not the solution. |
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