We are now leaving the shadow of the 10-year anniversary of the South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain, Colorado, but we will never escape the shadow of the 14 men and women who died fighting it that day, July 6, 1994. Family and friends are still feeling the terrible tragedy that is their deaths. Their grief can be sympathized with, but never truly felt, by those of us now reflecting on the events.

The costs of fighting wildfire are myriad. The environmental, ideological, and economic costs may be contested and debated, but the loss of human life will never be open to such discussion. The horror of losing an individual escapes the lexicon of cost/benefit analysis, for no value may be placed on such a life. It is priceless. All that remains following the death of someone in the field are questions and the quest for answers.

What happened on Storm King Mountain that day is well documented. The site of the fire was a steep, hazardous ridgeline with few escape routes and a glut of fuel. The fire was being directly engaged by 49 firefighters at the time of the disaster. A red flag warning for a cold weather front had been issued, but the warning was either under appreciated or simply not conveyed to the men and women on the ground. The cold winds fed the wildfire, causing a blowup that sent flames up the surrounding ridges at high speeds. 12 individuals attempting to escape a spotfire spreading up a west ridge flank at 45 mph were overtaken. 2 members of a helitack crew were caught in a steep rocky chute while trying to evade the fire.

There were many contributing factors to the disaster. Weather conditions and hazardous terrain were obvious causes, and an investigation conducted by the U.S. Forest Service on August 18, 1994 also identified human error as a main reason for what happened. Poor organization and the "can do" attitude of the firefighters were specifically cited. Citing a "can do" attitude in many ways boils down to blaming the victim. It was inexcusable for the firefighters to ignore their safety protocols, but it was an equally questionable decision to put the firefighters above the fire on the west flank ridge in the first place. Those hotshots and smokejumpers who died on the west ridge were cutting fireline in dense brush with the fire located out of sight and below them--one of the "18 Situations that Shout Watch Out!" The fire had nowhere to go but uphill to the top of the mountain. It was extremely dangerous and ultimately tragic to place people between the wildfire and the mountaintop.

Another disturbing factor was the policy to manage Storm King Mountain as a fire exclusion zone simply because a subdivision was located at the base of the mountain. There is no way to ward off lightning by government decree. The local communities should at least been prepared for wildfires, but given that they were not, a safer and more effective strategy to protect the homes might have been to stage firefighters near the subdivision where they could have reduced fuels and cut firelines within the home ignition zone.

Total fire exclusion should not be the policy of our Federal and State Governments. The Forest Service already nearly all fires, but fighting fires aggressively and without the capability to start fire is reactionary. The fire policy is reacting to the placement of human developments when the placement of human developments should be reacting to the potential for wildfire. From a land use planning standpoint, building within a fire prone area should be managed similarly to building within a flood plain: building should be limited or extremely cautious, and done at one’s own risk. The lives of firefighters should not be endangered for houses placed with little or no thought to the probability of fire.

The placement of housing developments in fire-prone environments should be heavily regulated with regards to fire safety (e.g. prohibition of wooden roofs, vegetation management to keep a fire-safe perimeter around structures, etc.) so that if wildfire approaches firefighters have defensible space and more options for engaging a wildfire. Taking FIREWISE steps may also increase the chance of saving homes or developments even without the help of firefighters. Fire is a natural, necessary, and inevitable ecological process, and should be treated with respect and caution when building flammable homes and structures. Building in a fire-prone area is risky, and the dangers should be shouldered by the homeowner as well as if not more than the wildland firefighter.

The tragedy of Storm King Mountain reveals many troubling contradictions between our culture, fire policies, and fire ecology. The anniversary of this wildfire disaster should be a moment to remember the lives of those people lost, consider the reasons for their loss, and change policies so that a similar tragedy does not happen again. The fire community should not only include those professionals directly involved in managing fire, but also those lay people who need to learn how to live with fire. In this respect, the South Canyon Fire and Storm King Mountain should be a cause for reflection and reform by us all.